Preface
When I saw on the list of research proposals a subject about doctrine, I thought that it will be the easiest subject for me, according to the number of books I had read. Starting my research, I realized that it was not as easy as I thought. Indeed it was a difficult subject. But it was exciting at the same time, because I am trying to describe a new In theory, a nation develops its military doctrine because of specific military needs.
These needs may include countering a threat against the country or to develop the operational methods to carry out a particular national strategy. Ideally, this means that the nation should analyze the need first, then make the doctrine. However, in Africa the political environment is complicated and constantly changing. In such a case, a nation may not recognize the need for a specific doctrine until it is already involved in a conflict that calls for a particular strategy and conduct of operations. 
North Korean and Israeli Doctrine and US MOOTW Doctrine
The North Korean and the Israeli Air Forces are both small but capable forces. They provide a clear contrast between the types of doctrine that can be applied to smaller Air 
North Korean Air Force Doctrine
First of all let us discuss the Air Force doctrine of North Korea. In reflecting on the 1950-1953 war, the North Korean leaders have concluded that the first attempt at peninsular liberation was stymied for a number of reasons. These reasons included a lack of rear or reserve units, a small air force, military staffs lacking indoctrination in basic strategy, and soldiers insufficiently prepared in military and ideological matters. So they developed their own "revolutionary Warfare Strategy." The split between the former Soviet Union and China has contributed to the development of the Korean unique doctrine, called "the force."
They have synthesized the "best" of Russian (Soviet) and Chinese ideas of war, blending Russian conventional military art and Maoist commando/ unconventional warfare into a military doctrine. One can discern the influence of Chinese and Russian operational concepts of war by looking at the organization and force disposition and the introduction of communist ideology in military thought.
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Regarding their air doctrine, they follow Soviet air force doctrine within the limits of available equipment and training levels. This is especially true regarding the strict use of ground controllers to direct airborne intercepts and the extensive use of camouflage, concealment and deception.
Like the Russian Air Force, the Korean Air Force is equipped with dual-use jet fighters, which can be employed in both air defense and ground attack roles. Concerning the ground support mission, they do not train to what would be considered basic proficiency in the CAS (Close Air Support) role due to the North Korean emphasis on ground artillery fire. There Air Force has a very direct and narrow focus:
They have four basic tenets of military strategy. The primary mission is to protect the security and integrity of North Korea. The secondary missions include tactical air support to the Army and the Navy, transportation and logistic support, and insertion of special operations forces. Organization and disposition: Interceptor, ground attack, transport, attack helicopter, and transport helicopter regiments are formed from 830 jet combat aircraft, about 300 helicopters, and 80,000 personnel. Most of the aircraft are 1950s and 1960s Russian technology. 2 A major failure in North Korean doctrine is that technology is not a key element. The North Korean doctrine is elaborated for only one purpose: to take control of South Korea.
Given a situation of open warfare, they will commence military operations with a surprised attack on two fronts. They will employ Russian-style conventional shock attacks along the DMZ in concert with Chineseinfluenced unconventional warfare operations in the rear. Finally, they will endeavor for a short war, possibly as little as seven days. 
Israeli Air Force Doctrine
The second small Air Force doctrine to examine is that of the Israelis'. Israel is a good choice because its doctrine is very different from that of North Korean and it works very well.
To win, you've got to take risks. How does a commander tell which risks are worth taking? He has a lot of conflicting inputs. But computers don't give the answer. Nor does intelligence. None of them gives the answer. In Israel, it's the combat experienced commander who's qualified to tell which risks are worth taking. As one veteran Israeli pilot said after the June 1982 air campaign over Lebanon in response to American questions about how much doctrine the Israeli Air Force had written down, " Yes, we have books. But they are very thin. 5 Another concept apparent in Israeli air doctrine is:
The offensive, defensive, or deterrent quality of a military is important because it affects states' perceptions of and reactions to one another. 6 But it is difficult to apply deterrence facing to a type of enemy such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Hamas in Gaza stripe? Thus, the Israeli Air Force doctrine focuses more on actual offensive and defensive operation than on deterrence.
Disintegrated grand strategies, in which political objectives and military doctrine are poorly reconciled, can lead to both war and defeatjeopardizing the states survival. In peace or war, the fundamental question of political -military integration is whether the statesman has at hand the military instruments required to achieve those political goals deemed essential to the security of the state. It is also fair to ask whether the political goals in view fall within the state's military means and whether the political means selected unnecessarily inhibit the discretion of political authorities. The Soviet pulled out the stops in their aid to Egypt and Syria, going so far as to set up and operate an air defense system for Egypt. Israel was now engaged in an arms competition with the Soviet Union. To run this race , it was necessary to acquire a superpower patron of her own, the United States. For the first three years after the Six Day War (June 1967), US military assistance to Israel ran to forty million dollars a year. In the next three years it ran to four hundred million dollars a year, or 28 per cent of Israel's total annual defense spending. It is not clear that the IDF made any special plans to cope with less than forty-eight hours' warning. The behavior of the Israeli Air Force on the eve of the war suggests that Israeli planners felt they could fall back on some sort of disruptive aerial preemption in the event of insufficient warning. Or perhaps Israeli self confidence was so high that the possibility of an Arab surprise was simply not entertained. In either case, the absence of the expected warning was a major source of Israeli troubles on October 6.
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Just as important as the absence of warning was the inability to use the air force effectively once it was known that war was imminent. The air force, as a capital -rather than labor-intensive fighting force, was Israel's ever-ready ace-in-the-hole. It was the insurance policy against the possibility of surprise, the cutting edge of any preemptive
strike. Yet at this moment of crisis, a hidden obstacle suddenly emerged. There was apparently no way to use the air force that was consistent with the major political change in Israel's grand strategy, the increased dependence on the United States. Thus, on the morning of October 6, Israeli military doctrine could not provide an answer to the state's predicament.
A strength of Israeli military doctrine is that the failure serves to provoke a search for lessons learned to achieve military innovation consistent with the state's political goals. Mali has almost the same problems as Israel: political-military disintegration in grand strategy, operations other than war, stress of preemption and also the inability to use the air force effectively once it was known that the war was imminent (shown during MaliBurkina conflict). And thus, the Israeli experience can help Mali to improve or create its doctrine.
American MOOTW doctrine
This portion will be focused on the United States Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).
While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operationsother than war. 
Description of Mali Armed Forces Doctrine

As mentioned earlier:
Doctrine is what is being taught, i,e., rules or procedures drawn by competent authority. Doctrines are precepts, guides to action, and suggested methods for solving problems or attaining desired results. The Army doctrine is based on the French doctrine of "La Guerre Revolutionnaire."
The foundation of the doctrine of "la Guerre Revolutionnaire" was built upon two significant assumptions made by the theorists to give purpose to their doctrine and to explain the new type of warfare facing them in France's colonies. 2 This doctrine was modified slightly based on the experience of the first conflict of 1974 to fit Mali's unique circumstance.
The struggle for control of the population occurs in two phases. The first phase is entails the mostly defensive phase where the forces of order recognize and prepare for hostilities. The second phase, involves the government's development of an offensive and military stance in order to rid the territory of guerrillas. The first phase emphasizes constant vigil and the political counteraction of the forces of order. 3 The third part of Mali military doctrine describes the organization of the Air Force.
Under the staff are the Aerial Zones, the Bases, the Wings, the Squadrons, and the Units.
According to this doctrine, the Air Force must defend the territory through air superiority operations, provide close air and airborne support for the Army and is responsible for search and rescue for the civilian aviation. The foundation for the Air Force portion of the military doctrine is based on three different foreign doctrines. The Russian doctrine for air superiority, the French doctrine for the close air support, and American doctrine for transport.
The fourth part of Mali military doctrine describes the organization of the "Gendarmerie." Under the staff, the squadron, the company, and the Unit. The role of the Gendarmerie is to provide help for military and police. In fact, this special force is equipped and trained to be part of the armed forces in case of conflict, but their day to day duty is to assure (as the police), the security of the population.
The Armed Forces doctrine describes in fact, how these three major components work together in a joint environment along with the support of the other service agencies (Logistic, Health, Communication etc.,). This doctrine is useful for a joint operation. All the forces are trained to fight together (except the gendarmerie during its police duty).
Despite the fact that we have an independent Army, an independent Air Force, an independent Gendarmerie, all the force employment is managed by the Joint Staff. The first phase is assembling the objective information required from a wide variety of sources. The second phase is the formulation phase during which the doctrinal generalizations are developed. This phase also includes a trial balloon stage where draft statements are circulated to a broad audience in order to secure feedback. After evaluating the feedback and rethinking the proposed doctrine, we are ready for the final phasedissemination.…Doctrine must evolve out of the experience of all war it was easy to get material from Russia, but that has changed. From the Soviet perspective the issue of the size of the Armed Forces is obvious.
Colonel General Professor N.A.Lomov displays consistency in his 1962 and 1963 positions on this question, arguing "that even under conditions of nuclear warfare, mass, multimillion man armies will be needed 5 Mali has very limited resources, consequently it has a small Armed Forces and thus cannot appropriately apply the borrowed Soviet (now Russian) doctrine.
Without a unique Mali Air Force doctrine, there are two different types of doctrine mixed together and this can be dangerous. Mali is applying the Russian fighter doctrine based on the ground control radar The ground radar assistance is necessary in order to achieve an interception. The pilot has to follow the instruction of the ground radar controller. The consequence direct of this doctrine is that, in case of failure of the ground radar the fighters stay on the ground. On another hand, fighter doctrine in the Western countries give more freedom to the pilot who is not absolutely dependent on the ground radar control in order to achieve an interception. Can you imagine one Squadron with one part depending in 100% on the ground radar system, and the other part can achieve its mission without the assistance of this system? With the end of Russian aid and Mali closer military ties to the West, there is a real possibility that it will have even more a mix of different doctrines.
Another example can be the Air Defense System. The Russian system is based on a heavy system called "Pechora" which need three components to defend one single point.
Each group needs at least five to six days to be installed, and is constituted with ten to twelve trucks. One another hand, the Western system is based on a light system, easy to move. Again can you imagine a Group of Air Defense with these two systems and without a unique and specified doctrine (not a broad in a general Armed Forces doctrine)?
Another element is that Mali is deeply involved in MOOTW in Africa (Liberia, Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi, Central Africa, Western Sahara etc., ). Unfortunately, the Armed forces doctrine does not provide much guidance in this new environment and most of these missions need Air Force support.
Necessity independent Air Force and doctrine
The Mali Air Force was created the 6th February 1976. Does in fact Mali need an independent Air Force? Why would a country with such limited resources create a new service? There are reasons.
Mali is a large country in Africa (1,240,000 square kilometers), with seven neighbors (Algeria, Burkina, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, Niger and Mauritania). It's a landlocked country, with no direct access to the sea. The country is divided in three natural region. The South is forest, the Central part is savanna, and the North is desert (about 45% of the country). Like Napoleon said "the policy of a country lies in its geography." So, Mali can expect only on the road, the railroad, the river and the air means of transportation.
In the South and the Central part, there is a useful road network (highway, normal roads etc., ). The railroads are only in the South. There are two big rivers (Niger and Senegal), but this means of transportation is not permanent (only seven months per year).
For much of the country, air transportation is the only efficient means of transportation.
Unfortunately, there is not much commercial airline development inside Mali because the return on this investment will not be good enough to justify the cost.
Transportation is the essence of civilization.
The more rapid the intercourse between people, the more highly what we call "civilization" will be developed. Nothing throttles a people's development more than lack of transportation. 6 The whole means of transportation on the surface of the ground or water is confined to places that are easy to access over these elements; in the case of water: depth arbors, indentations along the coasts, and navigable rivers. In the case of land; where it is possible to build roads and railroads. Mali is about 40% is desert (with resources), with a very few roads and no railroads. No condition of this kind confronts aircraft as the air is a common medium all over the world. Aerial photographs can portray model farms, feeding places for animals, and shelters.
A great deal can be done by the air force in the elimination of insect pests, particularly locusts (example of the Philippine Islands.). Aircraft can be used extensively for the medical control in certain places (example of the snake bites in Thailand). "Where there is no vision the people perish.." This old Biblical quotation is more applicable to the development of aviation and air power than to any other undertaking. In Mali, we are at the turning of the ways in the development of our air power and the people, who are the judges of what should be done, should weigh the evidence on the subject carefully. In order to be successful in anything, it's necessary to concentrate one's mind, one's time and one's money on it in such a way as to get the greatest good with the least effort.
At this juncture, the Mali is faced with the alternative of keeping the old concept of the armed forces trained and equipped for a hypothetical war, or gets a "new vision" about the armed forces according to its own unique strategic environment.
The German treated change with caution and respect. Once they decided that a tactical change was necessary, they pursued it with the knowledge that several factors had to be changed in order for the doctrinal change to have the desired effect.…In developing doctrine, the Germans always considered another critical factor, the enemy How can we manage all these useful operations without "an officially accepted and scientifically-based views within the state and the armed forces"? We must keep and improve the joint doctrine but we must create an "Independent Air Force doctrine." What will this Independent Air Force Doctrine will look like?
Chapter 4
Suggested framework for Mali Air Force Doctrine
This chapter is a suggested framework for a new doctrine for the Mali Air Force.
At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment… It stated that basic doctrine "establishes fundamental principles that describe and guide the proper use of aerospace forces in war. Basic doctrine, the foundation of all aerospace doctrine, provides broad, enduring guidance which should be used when deciding how Air Force forces should be organized, trained, equipped, employed, and sustained. Basic doctrine is the cornerstone and provides the framework from which the Air Force develops operational and tactical doctrine. 9 Operational doctrine as a term appears later than the basic doctrine, according to an article in the Winter 1995 Air Power Journal . The article added that in the 1930s, when airmen began to try to write air doctrine, they had no definition of the term operational in the modern sense of that expression. One of the earliest uses of the term was postwar and meant that "the activity is in operation" in the sense of ongoing.
In the modern sense, operational doctrine establishes principles that guide the use of aerospace forces in campaigns and major operations. It examines relationships among objectives, forces, environments, and actions to ensure that aerospace operations contribute to achieving assigned objectives. 
PART I: Preparation of the Air Force for war.
This part should contained the organization of the Air Force, the training of the Air Force and the equipment of the Air Force.
The organization of the Air Force will state this necessity: to meet the wartime effectiveness, to make full, effective, and coordinated use of its total force, to exploit the speed, range, flexibility, precision, lethality and versatility of air power, to get an effective harmony between people and material.
The training of Air Force should emphasized the importance of human factor, the evaluation of the training, standardization of the training (despite the basic training in different countries), for all level of war including MOOTW, and the importance of professional military education.
The equipment of the Air Force will explain the necessity for the Air Force to get equipment which are congruent with the nation needs, to maximize the Air Force capabilities. According to the limited resources of the country, the Air Force needs equipment which can be useful in war or peacetime, and also which can be sustain easily (gas, price of spare parts).
PART II: Employment of the Air Force.
This part should contained the airmindedness, the role and missions of the Air Force, the tenets and principles of war.
The study of aerospace warfare leads to a particular expertise and a distinct point of view that Gen. Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold termed "airmindedness."
Airmen should understand, honor, and apply the various useful views of war resulting from the different operating environments within the profession of arms.
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The first role should be the control of the air. One important role of the Air Force is to gain air superiority. This permits air and surface forces to operate more effectively and denies these advantages to the enemy. The mission related to this role is counter air. In order to achieve sufficient air control, offensive counter air actions are necessary. These offensive actions should include attacks of the enemy command and control systems, bases, ground air defense systems.
The second role can be the force application. The missions connected to this role, are strategic attack, interdiction and close air support. Strategic attack can permit to attack the enemy's center of gravity, make at times important contributions in gaining a war's objectives.
Interdiction disrupts, delays, or destroys an enemy's military potential before it can be used against friendly forces. To achieve efficiencies and enhance effectiveness, the air component commander should control all forces performing interdiction with surface force operations to achieve the theater commander's objectives.
Interdiction can have effects on the tactical, operational or strategic level. Close air support will be apply to provide direct support to friendly forces in contact. Close air support needs plannification and coordination in order to reduce the risk of friendly casualties 13 .
The third role can be force enhancement. This role is connected to the missions of airlift, surveillance and reconnaissance, and special operations. These missions are vital to air and surface campaigns. Facing to a limitation of time, airlift can be the best way of transportation.
Surveillance must be designed to provide warning of enemy initiatives and threats and to detect changes in enemy activities. Reconnaissance must be able to respond to surveillance and intelligence elements to gain information of particular importance. Mostly, Air Force special operations is an integral part of unconventional warfare.
14 The fourth role is the force support. This role is connected to the missions of base operability and defense, logistics, and combat support. The first target of the enemy air power is to destroy the surface bases. And thus it's important to defend these bases.
Logistical capabilities must be designed to survive and operate under attack; that is, they must be designed for combat effectiveness, not peacetime efficiency. The combat support is very important and can affect the entire operations.
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The tenets describe how air power can be used to achieve military objectives. These tenets can be centralized control/ decentralized execution, flexibility/versatility and priority.
The principles of war can be objective, offensive, economy of force, surprise and simplicity.
Objective is "direct military operations toward a defined and attainable objective that contributes to strategic, operational and tactical aims." Offensive is "act rather than react and dictate the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The initiative must be seized, retained, and fully exploited." Economy of force is "create usable mass by using minimum combat power on secondary objectives. Make the fullest use of all forces available." Surprise is "strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared." Simplicity is "avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting military operations."
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PART III: Military Operations Other Than War.
This part should contained the purpose, the principles, the types and planning for
MOOTW. This MOOTW part is very important since Mali is involved in peacekeeping in
Liberia, in Angola, in Rwanda, in Zaire, in Burundi, in Western Sahara, in Central Africa
Republic.
The purpose should explain the objectives of the MOOTW part, which is to provide general guidance for military forces.
The principles of MOOTW can be objective, security, legitimacy.
The types of MOOTW can be the transportation of population or resources within the country, protection of the crop and environment, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace operations.
With the lack of transportation, airlift can be useful by transporting people and resources from the South to the North.
Air Force can help to spread products in the crop, to kill the bugs. It can be also used to monitor the moving of the elephant and other wild animals in the country.
In the case of humanitarian assistance, it can relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions inside the country or outside. These operations should be limited in scope and duration. Mali can do these operations alone or associated with a multinational forces.
Air force can be task to evacuate Mali citizens in a foreign country, in the case of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
The last but not the least operations are the Peace Operations.
Peace Operations are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations. Peace Operations are conducted mostly in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict.
Peacekeeping Operations can be defined as military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.
Peace Enforcement Operations are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace or order.
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that lead to conflict. -Winston Churchill
